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I
The idea of privacy is a vague one and difficult to get into a right perspective.
Numerous meanings crowd in on the mind that tries to analyze privacy: the privacy
of private property; privacy as a proprietary interest in name and image; privacy as
the keeping of one's affairs to one's self; the privacy of the internal affairs of a volun-
tary association or of a business corporation; privacy as the physical absence of others
who are unqualified by kinship, affection, or other attributes to be present; respect for
privacy as respect for the desire of another person not to disclose or to have disclosed
information about what he is doing or has done; the privacy of sexual and familial
affairs; the desire for privacy as a desire not to be observed by another person or
persons; the privacy of the private citizen in contrast with the public official; and
these are only a few. But not only are there many usages of the concept of privacy;
there are also the numerous related and contrasting terms: freedom, autonomy,
publicity, secrecy, confidentiality, intimacy, and so forth. In the ensuing paragraphs,
I will attempt to state a little more clearly what I mean by "privacy" and to place it in
relationship to other concepts.
Privacy is a "zero-relationship" between two persons or two groups or between a
group and a person. It is a "zero-relationship" in the sense that it is constituted by
the absence of interaction or communication or perception within contexts in which
such interaction, communication, or perception is practicable-i.e., within a common
ecological situation, such as that arising from spatial contiguity or membership in a
single embracing collectivity such as a family, a working group, and ultimately a
whole society. Privacy may be the privacy of a single individual, it may be the
privacy of two individuals, or it may be the privacy of three or numerous individuals.
But it is always the privacy of those persons, single or plural, vis-a-vis other persons.
In any society, most of the population is private in a certain sense vis-a-vis most
of the rest of the population. Mutual ignorance obtains; interaction is impossible
because no structural or spatial context of interaction exists. But this separateness is
not privacy in our sense. The phenomenon of privacy exists only in contexts in which
interaction, communication, or perception is physically practicable and within the
range of what can be expected of human beings. The situation must, therefore,
be one in which the abrogation of privacy by intrusion from the outside or by
renunciation from the inside is practically possible.
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Thus, it is relevant to speak of privacy only where the isolation of a person or a
group can be breached. It may be true that the personal private affairs of a factory
worker in Chicago are unknown to a factory worker in Dallas; neither of them has
ever encountered the other in any way or been a member of any common collectivity
except American society. But it is not this kind of isolation-noninteraction, non-
communication, or nonperception-to which the term privacy refers. We speak of
privacy only where there is a feasible alternative to privacy, namely, where actions
or words can be either withheld or disclosed, where a space can be inviolate or in-
truded on, where a situation can be disregarded or observed. Thus privacy pre-
supposes the prior existence of a system of interaction among persons in a common
space-it might be face-to-face interaction within a household, a neighborhood, or
village or within a unit in a corporate body such as a firm, an army, or a congrega-
tion; the presupposed system of interaction might be one in which there is ordinarily
no face-to-face interaction between authority and subject within a corporate body
like a large church, a large firm, a large army, or the state, and in which the inter-
action or perception is initiated by an agent of authority with the intention of in-
truding on the privacy of the subject.
What is privacy about? It is, for one thing, about information concerning the one
person, the two persons, the three persons, etc. But what is the question concerning
this information about which privacy might or might not exist? It is a matter of the
possession and flow of information. We say that privacy exists where the persons
whose actions engender or become the objects of information retain possession of that
information, and any flow outward of that information from the persons to whom
it refers (and who share it where more than one person is involved) occurs on the
initiative of its possessors. This means that other persons do not come into possession
of the information, they do not observe the actions that are the objects from which
such information is generated, nor do they receive it from records (photographs,
documents, or recordings) or from other persons who have observed the actions in
question. Privacy in one of its aspects may therefore be defined as the existence
of a boundary through which information does not flow from the persons who
possess it to others. The actions of the former are not reported to, or observed
or recorded or otherwise perceived by, the latter.
What is the decisive element in a breach of the boundary that defines the area of
privacy? It is the acquisition or transmission of information without the voluntary
consent or initiative of those whose actions and words generate the information.
Where the latter disclose the information entirely voluntarily and on their own
initiative, we speak of a sharing of privacy. Where the information is acquired by
manipulation, deception, coercion, or through a market mechanism, we speak of a
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disruption of or intrusion into privacy. Voluntariness on the part of the person
or persons whose privacy is in question is an essential component.1
The information which is in question here refers to any events that occur in the
private sphere. There are past and present relationships of personal affinity and
hostility, of friendship and love and hatred, erotic relationships or practices, the
primordial relationships of spouses, of parents and children, of siblings, of kinsmen,
and of neighbors. The information might be about the internal affairs of private
corporate bodies, the achievements, failures, and rewards of individuals in such bodies.
But is privacy only about "information"? What is private about the "private
life" into which a previously "public figure" withdraws? What about private space,
such as a building or a room or some other bounded area into which no one may
enter without permission? What is private about "private property"? What is
private about a person's face or body or bodily functions? What does the privacy
of property share in common with the privacy of "life" or space or image or informa-
tion? In all these usages, we refer to situations in which the individual or a group
of individuals exercises control over resources that belong to them. The "private
life" consists of the round of activities of one who does not hold public office or aspire
to it0 The private element in it is freedom with which the "private man" may
manage his own resources, wealth, material goods, relationships, and so forth, without
being answerable for what he does. He is not bound by the rules that govern public
life; nor must he carry in the private sphere the responsibilities that are inherent in the
public sphere3 The "private life" is a secluded life, a life separated from the com-
pelling burdens of public authority. "Private property" is property over which the
private man freely exercises control; he may do so because it belongs to him.
"Private property," the "private life," and "private information" refer to relation-
ships in which the individual or group of individuals retains "possession" of some-
thing that might otherwise be shared and that, if shared, is shared on the initiative of
the "possessor." The nature of the "something" is less important than the retention of
"possession." "Possession" means here the control over the movement of these prop-
erties across a boundary from person to person or from person to group or from group
to group or from group to individual. Whatever the "something" is, it "belongs" to
the individual or group of individuals.4 Individuals and groups of individuals have a
I It is at this point that it is pertinent to distinguish privacy from secrecy. Secrecy, too, involves in-
formation and boundaries affecting its flow. In secrecy, disclosure or acquisition beyond the boundary is
prohibited, and the prohibition is attended by sanctions in event of a breach. In privacy, disclosure is at
the discretion of the possessor, and such sanctions as laws provide are directed only against coercive
acquisition by persons outside the boundary.
2 It is worthwhile pointing out that until the nineteenth century in most of Europe and particularly in
England, pvacy meant a "private life," a life withdrawn from the governmental and civil arena. It
referred also to the closely related phenomenon of "private ends," ends set by a "private person" on his
own behalf. Only toward the latter part of the century did it come to refer to the privacy of information.
a In the private sphere, there are obligations too, but they are moral and not legal obligations.
' "Belongs" has long been the object of legal studies, but it has not been much analyzed by sociologists.
The failure of sociologists to analyze the meaning of "belonging" arises, it appears, from the tendency
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substantive existence which is recognized by the consciousness that inheres in indi-
vidual and in collective existence and that is acknowledged by those who have to deal
with it. As such a substantive entity, self-locomoting, conscious, continuous, and
conscious of its continuity, it generates and acquires properties (including "private
property") and lays claim to possession of them.
Thus we see that the claim to the possession of "private property" is an instance
of a more general class of claim to possession of a class of items more inclusive than
material goods or human services. If the right to privacy is to be regarded as a
"property right," then it is a right to a more general class of possession than "property
right" as generally understood, and infringement on that right must not be regarded
as assessable solely in the same terms as infringement on traditional property rights-
for example, infringement through trespass or theft. Rather the contrary; the latter
are particular variants of infringements on a more general class of possessions.
Now what is contained in this general class of possessions? It is the class of all
those things (words, movements, knowledge, states of mind, material objects, actions)
which an individual or group of individuals generates, makes, or "acquires" through
legitimate transactions. Possession of them entails right to their possession. The
right naturally requires acknowledgment, but the category of possession is logically
anterior to the claim and to the acknowledgment of the claim as a "rightful" claim.
The dispossession of these things which "belong" to individuals takes numerous
forms. A man may be robbed of his physical property or the government may con-
fiscate it. His "private life" may be constricted by obligatory military service, taxation,
legal restraints on his style of life, labor legislation, and so forth.
The dispossession of what belongs to an individual cognitively likewise has many
possibilities. What is comprised in these cognitive possessions? Relationships
between persons, including acts of friendliness or hostility, relations of parents
and children, the relationships of spouses, the relationships of siblings-in brief, most
primordial and personal relationships-sexual relationships, conversations, consump-
tion practices, most actions performed in private spaces.5 These cannot be taken
away in the way in which physical property or claims to it can be taken away. They
can, of course, be stopped or obstructed, but this is an interference with private
liberty.' What can be taken away is the knowledge of these actions.
of sociological analyses to "desubstantialize" individual and corporate existence into complexes of status
and roles, into identities and images, into personalities as complexes of mechanisms. Yet the conception
of "belongs" does not refer to what "belongs" to a role or a status. There is an individual or corporate
substance, an entity which has a role, which has a status, a sense of its own identity.
'These primordial and personal private actions (to which we shall refer henceforth as personal
privacy) are not the only ones which can occur in privacy. Conversations about corporate actions, con-
versations about competitive educational and occupational performances in corporate bodies, conversations
about public matters, may all occur in the private sphere, i.e., in private places and with other persons with
whom a personal private relationship exists. But despite their context, they are not personal private matters
in our sense and efforts to acquire possession of them will concern us only marginally.
'As contrasted with public liberty.
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One of the simplest ways of acquiring possession is to interview the person and
ask him questions directly or to lead him on through a series of questions to the
point where he produces from memory what could not have been elicited immedi-
ately by a direct question. These are the procedures of policemen, prying acquaint-
ances, sociological field workers, and psychoanalysts. The intrusions can occur
also through unassented to or surreptitious acquisitions of images, documents, and
records (electronic, written, and photographic) bearing on the private actions or
being of the person intruded upon. This acquisition might involve the creation of
new documents and records through the clandestine recording of conversations and
clandestine photography or the taking possession of originals or copies of documents
and records already existing in the possession of the person intruded upon.
Intrusion into the private physical, visual, or auditory space of another person can
be a product of an action by an outsider which is partly assented to and partly
coerced. A religious zealot insinuates himself across the threshold of a dwelling
and then refuses to leave. The telephoning solicitor of commercial custom or the
telephone interviewer, who, having got the subscriber to "answer" the ringing tele-
phone, presses his listener to take some form of action or to answer certaim questions,
approximates a coercive entry into a private space. The clutter of postal advertising
that falls through one's letter slot is clearly a coercive, if minor, intrusion. The noise
of one's neighbor's television set that comes in through one's walls or windows is
coercive, even if not so intended by the neighbor.
Much of the dispossession of private things is clandestine and coercive. The
agent who enters one's house or hotel room in a person's absence and without his
knowledge or assent and installs a recording or photographic or transmitting device
is acting clandestinely and coercively. The government officer who computerizes all
the government's data about particular individuals is acting clandestinely to intrude
on the privacy of those individuals; he is creating a new image of the individuals
without their knowing that he is doing so. A journalist who searches through public
records (for example, divorce court records) to exhume some old facts about the
personal affairs of a particular individual is intruding clandestinely on that indi-
vidual's privacy:'
Coercive intrusion need not be clandestine: A person who is tortured or otherwise
deprived until he discloses previously undisclosed actions, which might be either
private or public,' knows that this is the intention of his torturer.
"There are some difficult decisions to be made about the boundary between the public and the private
spheres. A crime, a trial on charge of a criminal action, and a sentence for a crime are clearly public
actions. Yet, they seem to change their status as they recede into the past. They tend to become part
of an individual's private sphere as if the crime has been expiated and if it is far enough in the past.
'Not all that is undisclosed is "private." Military and diplomatic secrets are undisclosed, but they
are not private. They "belong" to the state and not to the individuals who share them. Embezzlement
of funds from the government might be undisclosed by the embezzler, but the knowledge of the
embezzlement does not "belong" to him any more than the money belongs to him.
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Manipulation of the person so that he discloses his personal private affairs, based as
it is on deception, shares some of the properties of clandestine intrusion, but it does
not involve physical intrusion and it has its points of departure in a voluntary action.
Tests which the tester alleges are about one thing but which are intended to precipi-
tate an unwitting disclosure of some state of mind or previously performed action
are manipulative. "Subliminal advertising" is an intended clandestine intrusion into
the private sphere of the individuals to whom it is directed.
In what follows we shall discuss intrusions on personal and primordial privacy
above all, and deal with intrusions into corporate privacy only in the margin. We
shall be concerned in part with the following questions: (i) How much privacy can
a human being or group of human beings enjoy, given the fact of being born into
and living in any society whatsoever? (2) How much privacy can be enjoyed by an
individual or group of individuals, given the facts of existence in contemporary large-
scale industrialized urban societies? (3) To what extent do individuals or groups
of individuals desire privacy?
II
Existence as a human being entails being under scrutiny. Those who would aid
and nurture the infant could not do so if they could not observe it and receive from
it a flow of information about its needs and desires. Once the child becomes mobile
and acquires the capacity to communicate deliberately when it needs help, the com-
plete observability of the child's movements is suspended. The child too begins to
construct boundaries about itself. It uses its capacity to move to remove itself from
the observation of its elders, to support the desire to be outside the range of the
elders who exercise authority over him. The capacity for "keeping to one's self," to
be unobserved, to withhold information about states of mind and actions, i.e., the
capacity to retain possession of these emanations of the self and the desire to do so,
all move in an upward curve for some time in the early life span of the individual.
The physical and neural capacity and the desire for a discriminating control over
the disclosure of information about the self continue to expand for some time. But
it is not a unilinear function of age or physical strength. Quite apart from the level
of desire, there are certain ineluctable conditions imposed by life in society that
restrict the private possession of information about the self and about the groups to
which the individual comes to adhere. Kinship constricts the privacy of the indi-
vidual because it presents claims on him to be responsible for and to know about
other members of the group and for them to know about him. Common residence
makes him more observable, and absences raise questions that seek answers. Kin-
ship establishes claims that intrude into the individual's private sphere, that demand
information about actions and resources.
just as there are spaces or places to which such information can be restricted, so
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there are public places where some of it is inevitably disclosed. Streets, workshops,
places of assembly such as schools, theaters, meeting halls, public conveyances, are
all loci of disclosure, where the individual cannot avoid some measure of observation.
Very few individuals become hermits or recluses who never leave their "private
places" to venture into the open. Heat and culture both force human beings into
public places. The necessities of self-support by work in fields or workshops force
human beings to be where others can see them and can overhear their conversations.
Those who work in offices ordinarily have to share their space with others; those
who are more elevated in the hierarchy of authority might have a private office, i.e.,
a space to themselves, but the necessities of collaboration force them outward.
They must see others and be seen by them and therewith disclose something about
themselves, even if the disclosure is involuntary.
The density of settlement and stability of residence put families and individuals
into the presence of others and lay them open to the possibility of observation. It is
impossible to avoid this scrutiny as long as visibility exists, which means as long as
individuals must share certain common spaces. Visibility is the precondition and
often the stimulus to curiosity.
It is not in the nature of human beings to be indifferent to their fellow men.
The sight of any other human being arouses interest and the desire for some
convivial contact; it also arouses repugnance, hatred, malevolent curiosity. It
arouses, as the occasion calls for, affectionate sentiments, solicitude, fear. All of
these entail some penetration into the area of the circle formed around the observed
individual. (The boundary of the circle encloses the observed individual's past,
his memories of his past, his relations with and sentiments about all persons other than
the observer.)
Then there are the facts of authority. Those who rule, whether in the earthly or
in the spiritual realms, wish to see their subjects and to know something about them.
They might wish to know about their sins, large and small; they might wish to
have them present in relatively public places such as churches, temples, or mosques.
For the strength and welfare of the polity and the society, they might wish to know
how much "property" they own and what income they receive from it; they might
wish to know their names and numbers.
The need felt by rulers for the security of their own tenure and that of the
regime means that they will, in varying degrees, seek to be informed about opinions
which might have subversive effects. This too involves intermittent infringements
of the privacy of individuals to discover whether they intend to perform actions
disruptive of the public sphere.
Intensely sacred occasions demand the presence of those who form the collectivity
-christenings, confirmations, marriages, family reunions, funerals. They deny the
self-sufficiency of the individual and his right to absent himself. Collectivities the
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elites of which are convinced that they are in some way sacred or charismatic do not
tolerate privacy among their members. They expect their adherents to be com-
pletely absorbed into the sacred and to withhold nothing.'
All this notwithstanding, no society can completely obliterate all privacy. There
are walls which separate buildings, fences, hedges, blinds, and doors which offer some
protection to the privacy of families. However, much life is lived in the open,
there are some barriers, physical or social, that restrict the observability of the life
of a family--or of an individual living alone and apart from a family. However
much the authorities who control the state wish to penetrate into the lives of their
subjects, both their curiosity and their capacities are limited. Even if they would, they
cannot gain access to the life of everyone at all times; they cannot saturate the entire
society with their observational activities. Nor, for that matter, do they wish to do
so--even the elites of the most inquisitorial, absolutist regimes have not interested
themselves in absolutely complete surveillance, partly because they have known
that they did not have the power to accomplish it. The observations were made un-
equally.
The same has probably been true of gossip in traditional village communities and
stable urban neighborhoods. Not everyone attracted equally the attention of the
gossips and scandalmongers. It is likely that only certain families and individuals
aroused curiosity to the point that information based on scattered observations was
pooled, occasional observations subjected to intensive analyses, and questions raised
as to their significance. The range of curiosity of the curious and prying is limited,
and it is in any case not equally present in all persons. Some persons are more
curious--others are more indifferent.The separateness of places, the impenetrability of their physical boundaries, the
limited curiosity of equals, and the limited powers of rulers, and indifference, have
been the main bulwarks of that privacy which human beings have possessed or
desired to possess through most of history. Changes in any of these affect the
magnitude of the privacy that a society enjoys.
III
Let us turn now from these cursory remarks concerning the general limits on
privacy and on intrusions into privacy and consider the position of privacy in modern
urban societies. We will begin with European and North American societies in
about the third quarter of the nineteenth century.
It has often been said by sociologists who have studied urban society that it freed
men and women from the oppressive moral opinion of village and rural society.
It increased indifference to most aspects of the behavior of most of one's fellow
'This is one of the reasons why the radical leaders of pre-1914 German Social Democracy were
horrified by the "revisionist" view that Religion ist Privatscahe.
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citizens; in so doing, it increased the amount of privacy that they enjoyed-by
"amount," meaning the proportion of their total range of activity and thought that
was disclosed only to those to whom the actor chose to disclose it. Indifference was,
of course, fostered by large numbers and by residential and occupational mobility,
which habituated human beings to a condition in which they could live in relative
freedom from the scrutiny of others and could control the flow of information about
themselves largely at their own discretion.
Why did indifference increase? It was not a function of a dulling of sensibility
and sympathy; it was, rather, a consequence of the expansion and diversification of
sensibility. The urban environment was more stimulating. Politics, culture, indi-
vidual careers and ambitions, all drew attention out of the narrow primordial
sphere and turned it outward, toward public things.
The deflection of attention was helped by a number of ecological changes whieh
were associated with urbanization and industrialization. The diminishing sig-
nificance of handicrafts and of agriculture, and the increasing proportion of the
population employed in factories and offices, meant also an increasing proportion
whose place of work and place of residence were made more distant from each other.
The separation of place of residence from place of work, and the occasional change
of place of residence, permitted and sometimes enforced by the rapid growth of
cities and by the change in the character of districts within cities, meant that many
persons lived only segmentally and for relatively short periods within the range of
scrutiny of a given group of neighbors. There was too much else to do and too
little time for the focusing and penetration of curiosity into the lives of neighboring
families hidden behind thick walls, behind thick curtains and dosed doors. Con-
tacts between human beings became more segmented.
A greater element of voluntariness, arising out of personal affinity or affection,
entered into life. Friendship and love took a somewhat larger place in the economy
of human life and primordial compulsion a smaller place. Hence personal private
matters came with greater frequency to be voluntarily shared, while indifference to
those with whom such bonds did not exist resulted in a diminished curiosity and in-
trusiveness in the affairs of other families and individuals. Thus the privacy of
personal and primordial relationships was furthered and sustained by the urban
environment.
Alongside the basic ecological and economic changes, several other factors con-
tributed to this efflorescence of privacy in the third quarter of the nineteenth century.
One of these was the emergence of a conception of "respectability" among the urban
working classes of the industrial countries. Ambition, frugality, sexual propriety, in
orderly familial life, became ideals that were manifested in well-conducted house-
holds with sharply defined boundaries vis-a-vis neighboring families. "Scandalous"
behavior was to be avoided; where it could not be avoided, it was regarded as im-
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perative that it be "hushed up" so that neighbors would not learn about it. The
demand for and the practice of familial privacy were a common occurrence in the
respectable working (and lower middle) classes. "Nosiness" was abhorred; the
"nosy Parker" became the objection of revulsion.
A puritanical ethos gave another impetus to privacy. It not only emphasized each
man's responsibility for his own soul and the well-being and propriety of his own
family but also encouraged him to be ambitious. In doing so, it focused his attention
on a remote goal and thereby diverted his attention from his neighbors. The women-
folk, who might not have been so ambitious and who were more domestically con-
fined, were, however eager they might have been to penetrate into the affairs of
their neighbors, correspondingly eager to seal off their families, to draw a boundary
about their household, and to avoid the disclosure of domestic affairs. Ready though
one might be to find out about one's neighbors, the unwillingness to allow one's
neighbors to know about one's self made for discretion in informing neighbors and
for care to prevent anything that might conceivably be derogatory from emerging
beyond the walls of one's residence and garden. There was not just a preoccupation
with the improvement of the status of one's family but an equal desire to avoid any
action that might be injurious to the estimation in which the family held itself
and wished to be held by others. There grew up, alongside and underlying these
concerns, a sense of the inviolateness of what went on within the family.
The growth of individuality, the sense of one's identity as an individual, likewise
supported the belief that one's actions and their history "belonged" to the self which
generated them and were to be shared only with those with whom one wished to
share them.
The situation had not always been like this. When men lived in villages over
periods of many years they inevitably became well known to their fellow villagers.
Small variations in public conduct could easily be interpreted as expressive of changes
in that sphere of life which was not directly visible. Each man in a sense was the
possession of his neighbors. It was difficult to escape the scrutiny and the imagina-
tion of others. Urbanization and industrialization changed this to a considerable
degree-but, of course, not completely.
The growth of literacy and increased education, and the gradual involvement of
larger and larger sections of the adult population in education and politics, extended
the radius of attention. People did not cease to be interested in their neighbors; but
they had to contend with the increased resistance of their neighbors to being known
and with increased difficulties in knowing about them. Many more persons became
interested in affairs more remote than the affairs of their neighbors. The intense
desire to penetrate into the affairs of one's neighbors was probably attenuated by the
increased interestingness of the affairs of the larger world. This made for a greater
ease in the maintenance of privacy.
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The growth of religious sects in Protestant countries also fostered privacy because
it added another element of heterogeneity to any given district. The attendance of the
population of a particular district at a greater diversity of churches within that district
further complicated the crisscrossing of lines of separation beyond what was neces-
sarily entailed in the separation of place of residence from place of work.
On top of all this, governments became increasingly liberal and constitutional.
The "night-watchman" state set as its goal the prevention of collisions among its
citizens. The respect for private property that the state was concerned to enforce
helped to stiffen a general regard for privacy, and the ethos of economic individualism
worked in the same direction. The result of all these developments was a great
increase in the amount of privacy.
Of course, privacy was not a totally new phenomenon in the history of human
society, but the growth to predominance of the Northwestern European Protestant
culture and its diffusion to the North American hemisphere and Australia meant
also that civilization had shifted its center from Mediterranean and tropical dimes,
where much of life was lived out of doors. In societies in which heat, populousness,
and poverty cause much of daily life to be lived out of doors and much of indoor
domestic life to be lived in conditions of severe overcrowding of numerous persons
into small spaces-into one or a few rooms-much more of life is visible than in colder
climates and more prosperous countries. It is not that there is no sense of individual
or familial privacy in these societies-there is in practically all societies--but rather
that the limited physical or ecological opportunities for privacy are small, the culture
prizes it less, and human beings do not demand it so much as they did in Western
societies in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. In those latter societies, the
ecological supports of privacy were stronger than they had ever been before, the
economic and political systems favored it, the culture was congenial to it, and it
became integral to the prevailing moral outlook. No class of persons except scattered
and unorganized gossips had an interest in breaching the barriers which defined the
privacy of individuals and groups.
What we have said above applies largely to the upper sections of the working
classes, the middle classes, and the elites of the period in question. There was also a
large unskilled working class, immigrant and native. Among these, families lived
under very crowded conditions; many persons shared one room, many families
shared common facilities such as water taps, toilets, and baths. There was little
opportunity for individual or familial privacy. Much of their nonworking time,
especially in summer, was spent on the streets. Local gin mills, saloons, cafes were
the scenes of their leisure time. Most of their members probably regarded this as a
normal condition, and only the most sensitive found it painful to bear. Awareness
about the doings of one's neighbors, the gratification of impulses of curiosity about
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and malice toward them, were perhaps among the main pleasures available to the
more respectable who did not go in for brawling and drunkenness.
But if the poorer sections of the working class had little privacy with respect to
their neighbors, they were pretty well left alone by the public authorities. They had
to divulge a little bit of information about their numbers, occupations, ages, and so
forth, to the census. Except for very occasional interventions by the police in the event
of a serious brawl or a murder, they were left alone by the government. Such limited
social legislation as there was did not entail the collection of much information from
them. In America, the immigrant quarters and the local professional politician were
still only emerging; there was little of the "poor basket" charity which was later
developed by philanthropists and ward politicians and which opened the private affairs
of a family to outsiders. The mania of governments for information was still in a
nascent state.
Finally, 'it should be pointed out that, even in the most industrialized and urban-
ized countries at this time, a great part of the population still lived from agriculture,
either in villages or in the open country. In the latter, as throughout much of human
history, corporate familial privacy was high, individual privacy was probably slight.
In villages, there was much mutual scrutiny; tale bearers, scandalmongers, and
chroniclers of disgrace and misfortune were well established. On the other hand,
the isolation of villages from each other meant that if anyone did come into one from
the outside, his past remained his own possession. Government was as uninquisitive
in the countryside as it was in the great cities.
IV
Many changes took place in the half century that succeeded the "golden age of
privacy." The trend toward industrialization and urbanization continued. In-
creasing prosperity and a higher standard of living afforded somewhat better housing
conditions and therewith more individual privacy and more familial privacy as well.
Occupational and residential mobility permitted and fostered escape from watchful
eyes. The decreasing proportion of unskilled labor in the industrial working class
meant an extension of the culture of "respectability." Thus, as far as the infringe-
ments on privacy by equals were concerned, the situation was rather like what it was
in the earlier age.
But it is not only the practice of privacy by equals within a narrow radius that
interests us here. Privacy is also affected by the activities of those who stand at the
center of society, in positions of authority in political, administrative, and cultural
institutions. Here a very considerable change in the situation of privacy occurred.
One of the ways of estimating the changed position of privacy since the golden age
is to examine the development of those institutions at the center of society which
regard it as their task to intrude on privacy. The main intruders from the center
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were popular journalism, private police and investigators, the specialists of personnel
recruitment in large-scale private business, and the practitioners of psychological and,
to a much smaller extent, sociological research. We shall deal with each of them
briefly.
The spread of literacy into sectors of the population that did not seek education
as part of their economic, political, cultural, and moral improvement meant a spatial
extension of the range of attention of many persons without a corresponding enlarge-
ment of their interests into politics and culture. These persons, who were very
numerous in the middle and working classes, became the fit audience of the popular
press that came forward strongly at the end of the last century. The popular press
attempted to satisfy the two sectors of the relatively recently literate population-
those who became interested in public political affairs, albeit in a simplifying manner;
and the others, who were also attracted by the center of society but could not manage
to divert their interests from the personally and familially private affairs of the
center to its political aspect.
The fact that the popular press was able to consolidate its position among the large
new literate public was evidence enough that the previous expansion of privacy did
not represent a unilinear trend in the course of which the human race would divest
itself more and more of its concern to intrude into the privacy of others. The very
lengthening of the radius of attention made possible by literacy and education gave a
new instrument to the desire to penetrate into the privacy of others. Frustrated as
it was locally by the barriers of walls and doors and the very deeply rooted barrier
thrown up by "respectability," the hunger to subject others who were more remote
to one's own scrutiny found new stimulus and sustenance through the popular press.
There were two main objects of this desire to penetrate. The emergence of an
incipient mass society at the beginning of the century was evident in the inclination
among the peripheral strata to interest themselves in the center of society. The ex-
tension of the franchise, the development of the labor and socialist movements, im-
pelled the attention of the more intelligent toward the working of the economic and
political systems and the role of the ruling classes. The less intelligent also turned
toward the center. They were enabled by the yellow press both to dwell among
images of the center and to enjoy the remote and unilateral intimacy which that made
possible. The carrying impulse was a rather primitively political one, a desire for
knowledge of the scandalous doings of the mighty. This desire to know "scandalous
things" about the mighty was a desire to be in proximity to the mighty, the famous,
the glorious, the authoritative, and to derogate them at the same time. Affirmation
and sacrilege were rendered simultaneously practicable by the activities of the new
profession of popular journalism. The result was a new sector of the profession of
journalism that regarded the penetration of the private sphere as its main occupa-
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tional task. It justified this penetration by reference to the satisfaction of popular
desires and the freedom of the press unrestrainedly to enlighten the public.
This early stage of the development of mass society was also, as is well known,
a period of exfoliation of revolutionary movements on the Continent of Europe.
This had numerous repercussions in the United States and Great Britain as well as
on the Continent, although neither of the former had a revolutionary movement of
any consequence. Vague apprehensions and acute fears of bomb-throwing anarchists
were a major feature of the upper and upper-middle class culture of the i89os and
the first decade of the present century. In the United States this was aggravated by
the violence of the conflicts between industrialists and their employees. Special
private police and detective services were established by employers as a means of
coping with their dissatisfied workmen.
Secret police were not new; they are as old as empires. In France after the
Restoration, secret police began to devote their attention to the "dangerous classes,"
the urban poor, who with the growth of industrialization on the Continent nurtured
in their midst small revolutionary sects. A police speciality was the penetration of
these sects through spies and informers, and so it continued throughout the century.
The transfer of some of the personnel of these anarchist sects to the United States
brought similar concerns and interests to the American police. The difference was
that, in the United States, the governmental police-state and local-carried only a
small proportion of the responsibility of surveillance and repression. Independent,
privately organized bodies of policemen and investigators did the rest.
They performed not only the ordinary police functions of guarding property and
supervising public places within and around industrial plants; they also performed
"undercover operations," penetrating into organizations by pretending to be sym-
pathetic devotees of the cause of the organization. They attempted by deception to
learn about the affairs of the organizations and about the vulnerabilities of their
leading members, such as dubious sexual practices, prison records, and so forth, which
permitted them to be blackmailed into submission or discredited. The result was a
"profession" of private investigators, experienced in illicit entry and observation, in
deception, in acquiring and exploiting the confidence of a wide variety of persons
for the purpose of gaining information about personal relationships and past histories.
Industrial police, "coal and iron police," "railway police," and private operatives
came into existence on behalf of private property. They were the private property
owners' means of self-help. Whereas in continental Europe such police were part of
the state apparatus, in the United States they were to a substantial extent private
enterprises. They were often established by former governmental police officials,
and, once the pattern became established, their numbers multiplied. In Europe a
police official could cease being an official only if he ceased being a policeman; in
the United States this was not so. The characteristic American readiness to leave
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one career and the problematic status of public employment provided a perpetual
source of "private operatives" ready to "shadow," impersonate, eavesdrop, wire-tap,
and, in every other technologically feasible way, to penetrate into areas generally
regarded as private.
The changes in the mores of Western Europe and America which made divorce
more permissible, while the legal obstacles to it still remained, also contributed to the
growth of the investigative profession. Jealous or suspicious spouses, or those already
convinced of their partner's infidelity and now seeking legally valid grounds for
divorce, came increasingly to seek the aid of private detectives to "shadow" and
observe, to perform clandestine operations to obtain documents, photographs, and
other evidence. Throughout both Catholic and Protestant Europe, such a profession
existed; but partly because it was not reinforced by a numerous private industrial
police, Europe did not come to know this large body of specialists eagerly offering
their services in the infringement on all sorts of privacy for every purpose.
The establishment of a professional interest in the breaching of the boundaries of
personal privacy was furthered by the simultaneous growth of mass-production
industry based on semi-skilled labor and the growth of scientific academic psychology
in the second and third decades of the present century. Employers, distrustful of
their actual and potential employees, in whose capacity, loyalty, and honesty they had
little confidence, were greatly attracted by the claims of psychology. The use of
intelligence and vocational aptitude tests, which were first applied on a large scale
for military purposes, helped to set the stage for the acceptance of "personality in-
ventories." The concomitant growth of the profession of personnel management
created another vested interest in the treatment of each potential employee both
as an instrument of industrial efficiency without inherent dignity and- as a potential
enemy whose innermost aptitudes and propensities had to be disclosed and assessed,
since neither his resourcefulness nor his loyalty could be counted on.
The distrust that employers felt for their employees was not just a product of the
acute and often violent conflicts between employers and employees that were endemic
in American industry in the thirty years preceding the First World War. It came
also from the increase in the labor force employed in large commercial and in-
dustrial enterprises. The rapid growth and the recruitment of this new labor force
was accompanied by high turnover rates. The large size of firms diminished oppor-
tunities for prolonged face-to-face contact between employers and their subordinates.
Whereas previously an employee came into a smaller firm while young, after having
served an extended apprenticeship under other employees of long-demonstrated
capacity and loyalty, and with the expectation from both sides that, barring in-
competence and depression, he would remain in the service of the firm indefinitely,
the new candidate for employment came without this background or expectation.
As long as firms were small and expanded slowly, a substantial number of the new
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employees might come from the family of one who was already an employee; that
was another assurance to the employer of his reliability. A culture in which an
employee remained in the service of the same firm for ten or twenty or thirty years
or more was not one which impelled employers to seek supplementary means of
ascertaining the skill or the moral reliability and fidelity of those whom they took
into their enterprises.
But all these old conditions of employment became much rarer after the First
World War. The employer ceased to know the men on his shop floor; the managers
of great banks and insurance companies no longer knew their clerical employees.
They came without any known and trusted sponsorship and the employers felt no
assurance about either their skill, their zeal, their fidelity, or their honesty.
Psychology as a subject of research and teaching in American universities did not
owe its intellectual origin to these developments in American economic and social
structure. It was one of the numerous interests imported from Germany when
American universities drew their inspiration from the universities of that country.
But once it became established, it responded to the American situation. Aptitude and
intelligence testing, the psychology of personnel or industrial psychology, soon found
a place in the American psychology syllabus and assumed a prominent position in the
agenda of psychological research. (It was, in the i93os and 194os, joined by clinical
psychology and the academic adaptations of psychoanalysis.)
The professional personnel manager and the university-trained psychologist
naturally had a vested interest in the cultivation of these practices, and the apparent
success of the Taylor movement on the physical side of the management of industrial
labor power also produced a conviction in the employer that it was in every respect
to his advantage. It was efficient and therefore profitable; it was scientific and there-
fore modish; and it appeared also by its reliability to divest him of weighty moral
responsibilities.
Such was the situation as it developed in the United States from the last decade of
the nineteenth century. Class antagonism, increased disrespect for authority, the
growing sophistication of academic psychology, and the growth of literacy throughout
the population had resulted in the creation of a number of occupations which special-
ized in intrusion into personal privacy, and which-as practitioners of any occupation
usually do-regarded their activities as morally proper and socially useful. They were,
moreover, numerous enough, and they served rich enough and powerful enough in-
terests, for them to impose themselves at the margins of public consciousness as pillars
of. society.
V
,The period since the end of the Second World War has witnessed a powerful
reinforcement of those hitherto well accepted and generally uncriticized intruders.
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The war itself, and the Cold War which followed it, created new organizations of
specialists in intrusions and new arguments for their indispensability.
Espionage and counterespionage flourished on public funds as never before.
The Office of Strategic Services, Military Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, and, later, the Central Intelligence Agency carried on a far-flung and intense
activity in acquiring information by clandestine and related techniques; they also
trained large numbers of persons in the techniques and technology of intrusion.
Released to civilian life after the war, they provided the personnel for numerous in-
vestigative agencies. They constituted a stratum of vigorous enterprisers recom-
mending the use of their services to prospective users in many spheres of life. The
technology of observation and recording, building on electronics and nuclear physics,
shot ahead in a manner completely without precedent. Much of this technology
became relatively inexpensively available to private operatives, and espionage and
counterespionage organizations.
The preoccupation with "security" provided another motive for intrusion into
personal private affairs and the occasion for the formation of another vested institu-
tional interest in the penetration of the private sphere of numerous individuals.
The activities of the House Un-American Activities Committee and the Senate Sub-
committee on Internal Security forced the administrative branch of the federal
government, as well as state governments and private employers-whether or not
they dealt with "secrets"--to institute "security checks" on their employees. By this
time, academic psychology had advanced further in its diagnostic technology, and
parts of it found application in the "security program." A variegated battery of
personality inventories, projection tests, and lie detectors was brought into play to
guarantee against the employment of persons whose disposition or vulnerability might
lead them to disclose "secrets" or to behave "disloyally" in any other way.
The "security program"--governmental and private-gave a further impetus to the
development of the occupations concerned to intrude into personal privacy. Familial
relationships, friendships, personality qualities, sexual practices, relations with
neighbors, recreational preferences-all extending far into the past-became objects of
detailed scrutiny.
In the past decade there has been a decline in the intensity of anxiety about
security and loyalty, but investigative routines have remained the same. The occu-
pational and political interests are too powerful to permit a discontinuance of an
ostensibly perfectly legitimate activity. Those administrators who exercise authority
over the persons who have been strained and sifted through the inspection of their
past, personal and political, prefer to maintain the system as it is. Even if they do
not believe completely in its efficacy or pertinence, they have become used to it and
they now regard it as part of the natural order of things. They also do not with to
risk criticism from politicians on a question on which they have no strong feelings.
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Furthermore, those who are subjected to this privacy-invading scrutiny do not object
or, if they do object, they are without influence.
. On top of all this comes the factual hunger of all government bodies. As the
range of government activities widens, and as they reach more deeply into the
structure of society, government departments gather more and more information
about the persons for whom they provide services or whom they seek to control.
There is nothing new in these information-gathering activities as such. Govern-
ments have always sought to obtain information about their subjects-the Roman
census, the Anglo-Norman Domesday Book, and the Nuremberg and Swiss can-
tonal censuses of the fifteenth century are illustrative of the antiquity of govern-
mental information-gathering. When the modern liberal order was envisaged by the
Benthamite radicals in Great Britain early in the nineteenth century, inspection and
reporting were the devices they foresaw to discover the effectiveness of reformative
legislation. The interest of a government in examining its society in a matter-of-fact
way and in publishing reports of what is observed testified merely to its interest in
framing its policies in an enlightened way and in enlightening public opinion regard-
ing the grounds and the efficacy of its decisions.
These considerations are still of great influence in the government's information-
gathering. Two developments have intervened since the early nineteenth century.
The first is the wealth of governments, coupled with the present-day belief in the
central importance of social science research. Governments can now employ many
persons with social science training and interests. For these persons, gathering in-
formation is a legitimation of their existence. With the mighty resources of the
government at their disposal, it is only natural for them to collect all the information
they can, particularly since it can be justified by the needs of rational administration,
control, and service.
From this assembly of facts by various government departments, it is only a step,
which some have already proposed, to the collation of all the information gathered
about each individual into a computer-equivalent of a dossier. It is all conceived with
innocent intentions, as if it were both necessary and just that each individual member
of society should be exhaustively known by the government. They have in mind
no particular or immediate use for these computer "dossiers." They just think
that it is a "good idea" to have them-so far have they strayed from respect for
privacy.
Another factor in making it appear normal and necessary to collect, both openly
and clandestinely, personal private information is the "dishonesty crisis" in industry.
Thefts by employees have been regarded as on the increase, as has the divulgence of
industrial secrets. Since ordinary police practices were inadequate, the testing of
prospective and present employees was adduced as a supplement. In addition, other
methods of gathering information were applied in an effort, which has not been
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notably successful, to halt the ravages of the "dishonesty crisis." The very persistence
of the crisis is deemed a justification for further intrusions into privacy.
The development of empirical social research in the period since the Second World
War is relevant to our consideration of the vicissitudes of privacy in contemporary
society. Ever since sociology became an empirical subject, it has lived in the presence
of the privacy of the persons it studied. The technique of participant-observation
involved the possibility of intrusions into personal privacy by direct interrogation-
as does the contemporary survey technique. It also permitted, through long dwelling
in the community studied, considerable observation of personal private actions which
the person observed did not intend to disclose. As far as I can recall, until about
1955 there was never any question of the ethical status of this sort of research. It was
generally understood that the anonymity of particular informants was to be observed,
but nothing more was required.
The shift away from participant-observation toward sample surveys as the main
mode of sociological field work has been attended by a much more penetrating in-
quisitiveness into the personal private sphere. This is partly the result of psycho-
analysis, which commended to the attention of sociologists phases of conduct with
which they had not previously dealt. The progress and enlarged self-confidence of
sociologists have also encouraged this, as well as the greater impersonality of the
new techniques. The new techniques of sociological research, by restricting the tie
between the investigator and the person investigated, have reduced inhibitions against
intrusion into personal privacy. The absence of a personal relationship between
investigator and the investigated weakened the barriers to penetration and intrusion
which the quasi-personal ties in some way supported1 The partial dissolution of
traditional inhibitions regarding discussion of sexual practices opened a whole new
front of intrusion into the personal private sphere. What was once prurience and
voyeurism has now become "scientific curiosity." What was once "exhibitionism" is
now cooperation in "scientific research." What was-once regarded as the subject of
"blue films" and "circuses" is now called a "research situation." The result is the
same--an invasion of personal privacy of an extreme character, more elaborate and
naturally better documented than its pre-"scientific" predecessors.
Such effectiveness as the police have had in dealing with those who repeatedly
commit crimes was always to some extent a result of their intimate knowledge of the
"criminal underworld." Through long experience and the accumulation of knowl-
edge of the habitual practices of criminals and through "informers," the police came
to know a great deal about the personal private affairs of criminals. They had no
compunction about obtaining and using such information to trace criminals; there
was little or no objection from the law-abiding public about these procedures.
10 Of course, unlike the popular press, its disclosures are not given personally identified and wide
publicity. And unlike the disclosures of the "security" services, they are not given "secret publicity,"
i.e., arcanic circulation within authoritative bodies.
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Then came the revolution in communications technology: telephone tapping, the
recording of conversations, the "bugging" of places where criminals gathered, long
distance photography, and so on. The police were not the first to use such tech-
niques, but once their effectiveness was demonstrated the police too began to use
them. The increased resourcefulness and the undiminished daring of criminals
placed the overworked and understaffed police in a position in which they were at a
disadvantage vis-d-vis the criminals if they did not use some of the newer techniques.
Even now, however, it does not seem as if the police are the major intruders into
personal privacy. Much more of it is done by the national security services, by
private operatives, and by the mass communications-both the press and the television.
In our review of the institutional organization of privacy intrusion in the middle
of the twentieth century, a word must be said on the investigation of credit-worthiness.
The rising standard of living and the increased demand for an even higher standard
of living has given a tremendous impetus to installment buying and purchase on
the basis of bank loans, loans from money-lenders. All of this has again involved
the acquisition by private investigative agencies of a considerable amount of personal
private information about resources, spending habits, and so forth, of individuals and
families. (There is no code of ethics among those who acquire this information to
use it only for the particular purpose for which it has been acquired. Either
gratuitously or for a small charge they will make this information available to other
investigative agencies.)
Closely allied to this system of investigation of retail purchasers is the elaborate
system of promotion which is based on another form of privacy-intrusion. It is a
common practice in the United States for firms having a list of names of customers
to sell that list to any other firm wishing to pay for it. In consequence, many indi-
viduals who have made a purchase from one firm are placed in a position where
their privacy is intruded upon by solicitations, usually by post and less frequently by
personal intervention or by telephone, on the part of other firms in the hope of per-
suading them to make still another purchase in which they have never indicated any
interest.
Finally, a few words should also be said about a major development in the theory
of personality which has found application in or legitimated numerous of the more
recent forms of intrusion into personal privacy. This is the idea of the personality
as a system.
The idea of the unity or wholeness of the human personality is an old one, but
it has become the object of research and the basis of manipulative actions only rela-
tively recently. Instead of the idea of separately functioning sectors of the individual
personality, there gradually took form the idea that all the various functions were
interconnected; from this postulate the hypothesis was derived that small and
apparently insignificant pieces of conduct could be interpreted as indicative of those
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more important states of the individual's personality and propensities for action
which could not be directly observed. The psychoanalytic theory of the psychic
economy; the "psychoanalytic interpretation of everyday life," according to which tics,
gestures, slips of the tongue, and so forth, express dispositions; and the word-associa-
tion test, which was developed by Jung on this presupposition, were each a contribu-
tion to a mode of diagnosis according to which visible and elicitable actions permitted
inferences about interior dispositions and impulses which would determine future
actions. The psycho-physiological unity of the personality system is also the pre-
supposition of the "lie detector" test. Employers and their personnel managers and
security officers were eager beneficiaries of these techniques which would enable them
to discover and select those persons whose impulses, as disclosed by such tests, would
eventuate in loyal, efficient, and cooperative conduct.
VI
In the course of the past quarter century, certain trends in intrusion into personal
privacy that date back to the last part of the nineteenth century have been accentu-
ated. The increase that we have noted has been the accomplishment mainly of certain
sectors of the elite of our society among the highly educated and literate and those
who occupy authoritative roles. Intrusions into privacy have been so intertwined
with the pursuit of objectives that are unimpugnable in our society, such as freedom
of the press, the protection of public order, the prevention of subversion, the pro-
tection of private property, and industrial and administrative efficiency, that each
extension of the front has been accepted as reasonable and useful. Each objective has
appeared, to large sectors of the elites at the center of society, to be well served by
the particular form of intrusion into personal privacy that their agents have chosen
for the purpose.
The movement has not been all in one direction. Certain sections of the legal
profession, the judiciary, and legislative bodies have repeatedly attempted, since the
end of the Second World War, to restrict and diminish the amount of intrusion
into personal privacy. In the past few years, the enormities of intrusion have acti-
vated a quite new concern to protect personal privacy. But the resistance thus far
is largely an elite resistance.
We live in a society that is often called a "mass society" and in which the demands
of the "masses' are said to be decisive in determining the character of the society.
To what extent have the masses been responsible for the intrusions into privacy?
They have not initiated them. Governments, journalists, employers, and social sci-
entists have been the main intruders into personal privacy. The masses have, how-
ever, accepted these intrusions both into their own personal privacy and into that
of others. They have accepted the excesses of the security programs in government
and private industry with negligible objection. They do not feel themselves con-
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tinuously under scrutiny--once cleared, the matter is settled, and in most instances
they know little of what is going on. And they show little solicitude for those
who are not cleared. It is believed that the practices are justifiable because they are
allegedly designed to catch the disloyal and subversive. As for the disloyal and
the subversive, they have no rights and no one should complain when they are
affronted.
As regards the doings of private operatives, most people do not come under their
scrutiny, and if they do they seldom know it. There is a belief that only wrongdoers
and potential wrongdoers attract the attention of private operatives, and they, like
those who are allegedly or potentially subversive or disloyal, have no rights which need
be considered.
Nor do the intrusions of the popular press and certain television features arouse
any moral condemnation; on the contrary, they are rather enjoyed.
The enrichment of the advanced modern societies of the Western world has made
possible an increase in leisure time; it has nurtured an increased hedonism, an in-
creased desire for pleasure. Increased leisure and the increased desire for pleasure
on the part of persons without either sufficient education or sufficient intelligence to
extend the radius of their interest or imagination beyond their neighbors, beyond the
personal onto a more trahscendent level, or to find gratification in the reading of
fictional accounts of personal private lives, have engendered a demand for allegedly
real accounts of the personal private lives of real persons who live in the center of
society, who are influential and creative. Television programs and popular maga-
zines include among their repertoire personal portraits, interviews which ask ques-
tions about personal private matters, explorations of the private affairs of public
figures in the entertainment and political worlds. "Candid cameras" are regarded
as perfectly legitimate-at least one has heard no charges of impropriety against them.
The intimacies of other persons are "interesting," and where they are degrading
to. the mighty and great, they are all the more acceptable. The embarrassments of
those who have discomfiting disclosures made about them are as attractive as a
boxing match.
Intrusions into personal privacy are part of the currency of present-day society.
Even though the government's intrusions, because they are usually held secret or
confidential by their official custodians, do not give the pleasure that is given by those
in the media of the press, daily and periodical, and the television, they are accepted
as having the same legitimacy as laws, taxes, and trade union fees. They are regarded
as not necessarily agreeable but probably right and in any case inevitable.
The belief in American society that the personal privacy of other persons should be
acknowledged and protected does not have a very strong or principled adherence
among the lower middle and working classes. There is, indeed, a welcoming of the
opportunity to share in the knowledge made available by breaches in the barriers
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around it. There is little resistance to infringements on one's own privacy, particularly
as long as the information so obtained does not circulate widely and as long as it does
not involve clandestine and coercive intrusion into private spaces.11 In the case of
many persons and for many types of personal actions, a wide diffusion through tele-
vision or press is welcomed. Most individuals do not wish any disclosure of personal
private actions which might be derogatory to themselves to be widely circulated, but
about more neutrally assessed intimacies they have much less reluctance. In fact,
they prefer a certain amount of publicity, not because they think that their private
actions will evoke admiration, but because they enjoy the act of sharing or com-
munion with a very large circle-at least for a short period. Perhaps they would not
wish to have all their actions-even those which are not morally reprehensible-
exhibited to a boundless audience; but, as an occasional variation from a state of un-
regarded obscurity, it is welcome.
Nonetheless, all these complaisances notwithstanding, and despite this enfeeble-
ment of the ethos of "respectability," there also persists among the citizenry of con-
temporary America, as well as in other countries, a belief that "one should keep
one's own counsel," that the family next door should not know all that goes on within
the walls of one's own dwelling place. There is reluctance, even repugnance, about
having one's own telephone conversations listened to by other persons, known or
unknown to the speaker-and that quite apart from any harm that might be done
by the eavesdropper. There is still disapproval of tale-bearing gossips, and there
is a modicum of respect for the privacy of those with whom one associates in face-to-
face relationships.
What is the relationship between the reserve just referred to, the readiness to
accept and even to welcome disclosures about one's own personal private affairs, and
the rather considerable indifference to infringement on the privacy of others? These
diverse and discordant tendencies stand in a complex relationship to each other, and
it is difficult to do them justice analytically. The few hypotheses that follow are
asserted with much hesitation.
There is more insistence on privacy before those whom one "knows," i.e., those
whose names are known and whose presence is frequent, than before anonymous
entrants into the private sphere, especially when they enter following even a simula-
crum of assent. This is so in the case of the interviewee in a research relationship
or the applicant for private or government employment. There is at least that much
acknowledgment of the rights and bona fides of authority. There is also a greater
readiness to accept an intrusion into the private sphere where the intruder supplies an
at least nominal guarantee that the information disclosed about private things will not
be openly or widely circulated. An assurance of "secrecy" or "confidentiality" is often
"Many persons seem to take the view that television surveillance of the behavior of employees within
a factory or office comes within the prerogative of the employer, since it is the employer's private space.
Protests originate more often among trade union officials.
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regarded as a wholly acceptable condition for the admission of an intruder into
one's private sphere.
But the fact remains that participation in the disclosure of the personal private
affairs of others, where it is not an object of intense exertion on the part of the
recipient, has an appreciative audience. Few indeed are those who will adamantly
refuse to hear about the personal private affairs of others whom they know or know
about. Whether it is out of desire for a wider conviviality or for the degradation and
humiliation of a fellow human being, the entry, on one's own initiative or through
the intrusive action of others, into other persons' personal private affairs is one of
the features of human society.
2
The point is that, quite apart from the ecological dependence of human beings on
each other, they cannot sustain a great deal of privacy. They do not wish to be con-
tained within the boundaries defined by those whom they know personally and
with whom they are in relations of intimacy and mutual confidence. They wish to
extend the scope of their existence through the exercise of their imagination. For
those who lack the creative power to spur their imaginations, the personal private
affairs of the fellow men whom they know and of the eminent persons at the center
of society offer more easily available sustenance for this need to extend the scope
of their existence.
Nor do they want always to keep within themselves. They want to extend them-
selves by sharing with others what they know of themselves. Sometimes they wish
to share this knowledge with particular persons, and the act of sharing also simul-
taneously erects a boundary which separates the community of the sharers.
They want to share in privacy. This paradoxical combination of control over
what belongs to the self and its transcendence in a relationship of sharing runs
throughout the whole complex of the phenomena which are subsumed under the term
"privacy." That Which is solitarily private is often impelled outward into a com-
munity of two persons; that which is personally private between two persons is often
impelled outward into a sharing between one of the two and a third person, and so
it goes-but nearly always with the intention that it should not pass beyond that
"
2 This willingness and even desire to know about the personal private affairs of others might be
functions of certain fundamental qualities of human beings in contemporary society. We refer here to
the increased individuality and the increased empathic capacity and needs of the expansive ego char-
acteristic of an individualistic and open society.
First of all, it should be said that the growth of individuality has contributed tQ the demand for
privacy. The awareness of self, of the uniqueness of the self, makes for a greater sensitivity to impinge-
ment on self, to intrusion into the zone around that self. Individuality makes for spontaneity and the
prizing of relationships spontaneously entered into and maintained by a mutuality of spontaneously flowing
sentiment. Such relationships generate a demand for privacy, since they feel the alien character of in-
truders who cannot produce the affirmative spontaneity necessary to a proper participation. But the'
growth of individuality has a dialectical relationship to privacy. Individuality has provided a necessary
condition for empathy.
Empathy entails a sense of affinity with the mind and state of feelings of other individuals. But the
empathic capacity also brings with it the desire to enter the mind and the desire to know what is there.
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third or nth sharer. Voluntary self-disclosure is not usually intended to be boundless.
The disclosure does not entirely annihilate the boundedness characteristic of privacy.
The desire for privacy is 'nearly always partial. There is a desire to be simul-
taneously in private and in "public" relations with particular other persons. Thus not
everything is shared with those with whom certain things are shared. Certain private
matters might be shared with some persons; other private things might be shared with
other persons.
VII
The present concern for privacy does not rest on the belief that every individual or
that every primary group must be a windowless monad. Communion is a good as
much as individual autonomy. Self-transcendence is as essential to man's existence
as the dignity of selfhood or individuality. The present concern for privacy does not
absolutize privacy.
It is also to be recognized that the personal privacy of individuals and groups
among their peers and intrusions into personal privacy among peers are not a great
issue. Personal privacy among peers is as strongly entrenched as most individuals
who possess it wish to make it. And in so far as it is not, most of the intrusions,
which do not involve the new technology of intrusion, are beyond the bounds of
control. At least they cannot be controlled by anyone except the persons or groups
whose personal privacy is intruded upon.
Privacy has become a problem in the past few decades not because the human
race has gone mad and wishes to renounce a valuable feature of existence. On the
contrary, there is still a great deal of attachment, both in daily practice and in prin-
ciple, to privacy, and that attachment is perhaps not less, and is perhaps even more,
than in previous times.
Privacy has become a problem because it has become engulfed in the expansion of
the powers and ambitions of elites and in the difficulties that they encounter in
attempting to govern and protect and please vast collectivities.'P
It is not that some of these intrusions into personal privacy are not necessary and
justified. The tasks which the electorate wishes modern governments to perform do
require much information; industrial enterprises must seek to be efficient; the mass
media must entertain as well as enlighten; public order must be established and
maintained and subversion prevented; systematic empirical study of human society
must be cultivated. Nonetheless, even though one grants that the common good can-
not be realized in a society consisting only of private entities and that the common
good requires some restrictions on the right of privacy, one is also impressed that
"I mention elites, private and public, even though I am aware of the obnoxiousness of the numerous
private detective agencies. The depredations committed by these against personal privacy are done either
at the behest of industrial and commercial employers or because of the unsatisfactory state of divorce laws.
If these two sources of support of the private detective agencies were reduced, the work of these agencies
would still remain a nuisance but only a minor one.
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many justifications in terms of the common good in very many of the instances of
,intrusion into privacy are mendacious in the extreme. A great deal of the intrusion
into personal privacy is not only an immoral affront to human dignity, it is also
quite useless and unnecessary from any serious standpoint. Much of it is unnecessary
to effective government, efficient administration, national security, the progress of
knowledge, or industrial productivity. Much of it is the frivolous self-indulgence of
the professionals of intrusion.
When we contend for privacy in contemporary society, it is not that we are
anxious lest all privacy be obliterated. That is not the problem. Obviously, each
individual will always be private to most other people in his society; and even when
his personal private affairs are penetrated, the knowledge so gathered will not be uni-
versally diffused. Such extreme possibilities are of no relevance to our discussion
because they are so improbable.
The significant intrusions affect either small numbers of individuals whose per-
sonal privacy is intruded upon because they are allegedly of "public interest," or
because an i-wisher seeks to "get something on" them. Or else they affect large
numbers, although segmentally; some authorities wish to be assured of their capacity
for acting efficiently and loyally on behalf of the interests of those authorities.
Sometimes harm is done by these intrusions. Individuals are made unhappy
and occupational opportunities are denied them. Sometimes it can be argued that they
are injured financially by such intrusions. But these considerations appear to be
of secondary importance. Intrusions on privacy are baneful because they interefere
with an individual in his disposition of what belongs to him. The "social space"
around an individual, the recollection of his past, his conversation, his body and its
image, all belong to him. He does not acquire them through purchase or inheri-
tance. He possesses them and is entitled to possess them by virtue of the charisma
which is inherent in his existence as an individual soul-as we say nowadays, in his
individuality-and which is inherent in his membership in the civil community.
They belong to him by virtue of his humanity and civility. A society that claims to be
both humane and civil is committed to their respect. When its practice departs from
that respect, it also departs to that degree from humanity and civility.
